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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal 
under and pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3, and Rule 5, Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals• 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal by the State of Utah 
from an order of the Circuit Court of Garfield County granting 
a Motion to Suppress Evidence brought by the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Respondent was a passenger in his own vehicle when it 
was stopped by law enforcement officers. An immediate search 
of the vehicle produced evidence used to support misdemeanor 
charges against Respondent. The sole issue presented by this 
appeal is the following: 
Was the stop of Respondent lawful under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, Article 
I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah, and 
UCA §77-7-15. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory 
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provisions are determinative of the issue presented for appeal 
in this cause: 
AMENDMENT IV, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
(Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of warrant) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
UCA §77-7-15 
(Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect - Grounds) 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
By Information dated June 23, 1987, Respondent was 
charged in the Circuit Court of Garfield County, State of Utah, 
with seven misdemeanor counts. Respondent was arrested after 
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the traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. The 
evidence available to the State of Utah to support the 
prosecution of Respondent was discovered as a result of the 
traffic stop and a subsequent search of the vehicle, 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent filed motions before trial to suppress all 
evidence acquired by the prosecution as a result of the traffic 
stop. An evidentuary hearing was held on the motions on March 
17, 1988, after which the parties briefed the relevant issues 
for the benefit of the trial Court. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial Court granted Respondent's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence based upon the illegality of the traffic 
stop, and issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (See Addendum). The ruling of the trial Court resulted in 
a suppresssion of all evidence which had been acquired by the 
prosecution. The State of Utah then petitioned for permission 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal. That petition was granted 
and this appeal followed. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
During June, 1987, Robert V. Judd, the Sheriff of 
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Garfield County, Utah, determined to conduct some roadblocks 
(T. 7, 33)• A brief planning meeting was held two or three 
days in advance, and although the plans were not reduced to 
writing, Sheriff Judd characterized the purpose as "A regular, 
drivers license, registration roadblock, spontaneous (T. 18).!f 
Four highways were selected for the locations of the 
roadblocks, but only two sites along those roadways were 
specifically identified, and one of those sites was only 
conceived in the mind of Sheriff Judd, that location not being 
communicated to the officers who attended the planning meeting 
(T. 20). Two of the roadblocks never materialized (T. 21), but 
the other two were conducted during the late hours of June 20, 
1987 and the early morning hours of June 19, 1987 (T. 33). 
Garfield County has no written policy which governs the 
establishment and maintenance of roadblocks, and written policy 
from another source was not utilized (T. 21). However, Sheriff 
Judd testified that he had, the previous year, published a 
notice in the paper that spontaneous roadblocks would be 
conducted throughout the year, indicating that he drafted the 
notice which was published in reliance upon a policy standard 
"that came down through the Fish and Game...M which he had 
learned about Mby word of mouth..." (T. 21,22). 
The first roadblock was maintained on SR-89 for one 
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and one-half hours (T. 24). A second roadblock was then 
initiated on SR-143, commonly known as the Panguitch Lake Road 
a location which is approximately three miles south of 
Panguitch, Utah (T. 21). This latter roadblock commenced at 
approximately 12:15 a.m., June 19, 1987 (T. 27). No overhead 
street lights were in existence at this location, no flares 
were utilized by the officers, and no advance warning signs 
were placed to advise motorists of the impending nature of the 
police presence (T. 27). Four people manned the roadblock, 
Sheriff Judd, a deputy sheriff, and two local posse members (T. 
27). Four vehicles were present, two of which were Garfield 
County vehicles, the other two being owned by the two local 
posse members (T. 28). 
The Panguitch Lake Road runs generally south from 
Panguitch in a gradual rise to the crest of a hill, and then 
descends along a straight course of roadway for approximately 
one-quarter mile before turning to the right. From the crest 
of this hill one has a clear vantage point southward to the 
location of the roadblock, and a clear view northward to 
Panguitch itself (T. 110, 111, 113, 120, 121). Viewing the 
roadblock from the crest of the hill, at night, one would see 
two red flashing lights, and a set of yellow emergency lights 
(T. 28, 188, 119). The appearance of those lights would be 
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consistent with the scene of some traffic accidents (T. 34, 38). 
While maintaing the roadblock, the officers saw head-
lights of a vehicle traveling from north to south, the vehicle 
itself and its occupants not being visible (T. 29). This 
vehicle turned around on the crest of the hill, a distance 
which was approximately one-quarter of a mile north of the road-
block, and then proceeded back to Panguitch (T. 29, 44). Based 
on that observation, Sheriff Judd instructed the two posse 
members to pursue the vehicle and stop it (T. 29, 30). The 
observation and reasoning of Sheriff Judd are revealed by the 
following question and answer: 
Q. When that vehicle turned around, what 
crime did you think had been committed? 
A. I had no idea (T. 29, 30). 
The two posse members responded to the instructions11 
from Sheriff Judd by entering a four-wheel drive Chevrolet 
pickup, which was owned by one of them, and started toward 
Panguitch behind the vehicle whose headlights had been observed 
when it turned around at the crest of the hill (T. 46, 47). 
The two posse members followed the vehicle three miles 
into Panguitch (T. 55), but did not observe any traffic 
violations (T. 56). The testimony of one of those officers, 
recited from his written report, stated that: 
The driving pattern was good all the way 
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that we followed him and we did not see 
anything being thrown out (T. 54). 
The posse members radioed ahead to Panguitch City 
police officers and a discussion ensued as to whether or not 
there existed probable cause to stop the vehicle (T. 69, 70, 
74, 75, 91). The Panguitch City officers in fact stopped the 
vehicle, in response to the radio discussion with the posse 
members (T. 69,70). The Chevrolet pickup being used by the 
posse members had a red light installed in its grill, but the 
officers disagreed as to whether or not it was activated (T. 
73). 
After making the stop the officers learned that the 
vehicle was a truck which was owned by Respondent (T. 96), and 
the identities of the occupants were then ascertained (T. 97), 
Respondent being one of them (T. 93). 
The officers then searched the truck, finding 
marijuana, alcohol and protected wildlife (T. 94). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Law enforcement officers manning a roadblock during 
nighttime hours saw the lights of a vehicle approach them to 
within one-quarter of a mile, turn around, and then proceed in 
the opposite direction. No crime was observed. The supervising 
officer at the roadblock stated that he "no idea" of the nature 
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of any crime being committed. Nevertheless, he instructed 
officers to follow the vehicle and stop it. Those officers did 
follow the vehicle, observing no traffic violations, summoned 
other officers by radio, and made a stop of the vehicle in 
question. Respondent was an occupant. The vehicle was 
immediately searched, with evidence being found to support 
charges then brought against Respondent. Reasonable suspicion 
did not exist to justify the stop. No officer was able to 
articulate any crime or public offense being committed or 
attempted. The stop violated UCA §77-7-15, Article I, Section 
14, Constitution of Utah, and the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The stop itself being 
unconstitutional, all evidence subsequently seized was 
inadmissible, and the order of the trial Court suppressing that 
evidence should be affirmed. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
A brief stop of a citizen by a law enforcement officer, 
even though the detention is brief and the purpose merely 
investigatory, to be lawful, requires that the officer possess 
"specific, articulable facts, together with rational inferences 
from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that . . .!! a 
crime has occurred or is being committed. This standard was 
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announced in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975). The "reasonable suspicion11 test of Brignoni-Ponce is 
codified in UCA §77-7-15. State v. Sierra, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 
53. This statutory provision allows a person to be stopped by 
a peace officer in a public place when the officer has ffa 
reasonable suspicion to believe" that a crime has been 
committed by that person, or a crime is in process or being 
attempted. The facts known to the officer which give rise to 
reasonable suspicion must be objective, and not mere hunch, 
guess work, or other non-articulable suspicions. State v. 
Carpena, Utah, 714 P.2d 674 (1986). 
The "reasonable suspicion standard is grounded in the 
Fourth Amendment, Constitution of the United States, and 
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah. State v. 
Trujillo, Utah, 739 P.2d 85; State v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
(1980). Brief, public, and investigatory stops, which fall 
short of a traditional arrest, are governed by these statutory 
and constitutional provisions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). No distinction in such an investigatory stop is made 
between that of a pedestrian and the stop of occupants of a 
vehicle. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649 (1979); State v. 
Cole, Utah, 674 P.2d 119 (1983); Sierra, supra. 
When a motion to suppress evidence is brought before a 
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trial court, contending that a stop has been made in derogation 
of the statutory and constitutional provisions cited above, and 
with testimony being offered regarding that issue, the trial 
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and findings of fact which are rendered to either 
grant or deny the motion should not be disturbed unless found 
to be clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, Utah, 745 P.2d 1255 
(1987); State v. Mendoza, Utah 748 P.2d 181 (1987). 
In the case at bar, Respondent was a passenger in his 
own vehicle. That vehicle was being operated lawfully on a 
public highway. Respondent's vehicle, within one-quarter mile 
of a roadblock, turned around, and proceeded in the opposite 
direction. Officers observed that driving pattern, and without 
more, stopped the vehicle. No crime was observed. No officer 
who observed the events could articulate any element of 
criminal behavior. To the contrary, officers testified that 
they followed Respondent's vehicle for a distance of some three 
miles and observed no traffic offenses. Prior to the stop, the 
officers did not know the identity of the occupants of the 
vehicle, nor did they have knowledge of any illegal contraband 
contained therein. The supervising officer in question 
testified that "he had no idea" of the nature of any crime 
being attempted or committed. Simply stated, there was not one 
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objective fact offered to support the stop of Respondent. 
The observance of a vehicle by law enforcement 
officers when the vehicle is (a) moving slowly, (b) at 3:00 
a.m., (c) through a neighborhood which had recently suffered a 
series of burglaries, where (d) the car had out-of-state 
license plates, did not afford sufficient facts to meet the 
reasonable suspicion standard so as to justify an investigatory 
stop. Carpena, supra. In Carpena, the vehicle was followed 
for three blocks, stopped, and a search of its contents produced 
a loaded pistol from the passenger compartment and thirty pounds 
of marijuana from the trunk. The Supreme Court of Utah held 
that the observations by the officers were not based upon 
objective facts so as to support reasonable suspicion. 
In Sierra, supra, this Court had occasion to consider 
the lawfulness of a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle. 
Sierra was the driver of a vehicle traveling on Interstate 15 
near Leeds, Utah. Officers passed Sierra, observed the driver 
glance away quickly, and bow his head. A computer check of the 
license plate of the Sierra vehicle found that it was not 
reported as stolen. Nevertheless, viewing the conduct of the 
driver as suspicious, the officers exceeded the speed limit in 
an effort to overtake and stop the vehicle. Before the stop, 
the officers observed the Sierra vehicle traveling in the 
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left lane of the highway at a speed of 56 miles per hour and 
pass two other cars traveling in the right lane. After the 
stop, the vehicle was impounded, searched, and controlled 
substances were found. Although paying tribute to the 
intuition of the officers, this Court viewed their observations 
as being insufficient to meet the objective standard of the 
reasonable suspicion test. The prosecution in Sierra also 
argued that the traffic offense (driving in the left lane) 
justified the stop. The Court analyzed that claim and 
concluded that it was a pre-text stop. In other words, the 
stop was viewed as having for its purpose the desire to 
investigate a hunch of criminal behavior, and not that of 
issuing a traffic citation. 
The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the lawfulness of a 
vehicle stop in the context of seven factors which were offered 
by the prosecution to justify a stop in Mendoza, supra. In 
Mendoza, officers observed a vehicle traveling on Interstate 15 
during early morning hours. They observed the occupants to be 
of Latin origin, and pursued the vehicle at high speed. The 
subject vehicle remained in the left lane in the face of rapid 
acceleration behind them of the officers, and belatedly turned 
into the right lane with movements characterized as "jerky11 by 
the officers. The officers also viewed the occupants as 
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behaving nervously and avoiding eye contact. The subject 
vehicle bore California license plates. Following a stop of 
the vehicle, marijuana was discovered and the occupants 
arrested. The Court explored each of the facts relied upon to 
justify the stop and found them to be unavailing. The Court 
then held the stop to be in contravention of Fourth Amendment 
rights. Since the stop itself was unconstitutional, the Court 
held that all evidence subsequently seized was inadmissable. 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1979). 
In the instant case, the conduct of Respondent was 
entirely consistent with law abiding behavior. Even the usual 
factors relied upon to justify stops are not present in this 
case. We do not have out-of-state plates. We do not have 
occupants of Latin descent. We do not have observations of 
,fnervousn behavior. We have no commission of a traffic 
offense. The officer who directed the stop of Respondent could 
not offer any rationale to justify the stop. 
Appellant argues the application of Sections 77-7-2, 
41-6-13, 41-6-13.5, and 41-6-67. However, Sections 77-7-2 and 
41-6-67 were not urged as statutory authority by Appellant in 
the Circuit Court, and cannot now be considered on appeal. In 
any event, they would have no application to the facts of this 
case. UCA §77-7-2 authorizes an arrest when reasonable cause 
exists to believe that a public offense has been committed. 
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That is a more exacting standard than the reasonable suspicion 
test which controls a resolution of the issue in this case. 
UCA §41-6-67 prohibits a U-turn when traffic is not visible for 
a distance of five hundred feet. In the case at bar, the U-turn 
in question occurred on the very crest of a hill when visibility 
existed for one-quarter of a mile to the south, and a greater 
distance to the north. 
Regarding Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, the trial 
court held that they had no application to the facts because 
the signals therein discussed were not in fact given by the 
officers. UCA §41-6-13 prohibits the willful non-compliance 
with the lawful order or direction of a peace officer, and UCA 
§41-6-13.5 proscribes the failure to stop a vehicle when 
signaled to do so by an officer. No such signals were given to 
the vehicle in this case before Sheriff Judd directed that it 
be pursued and stopped. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that 
the very existence of the roadblock, with the lights which were 
visible, constituted a signal or direction for the vehicle of 
Respondent to stop. That argument would produce ludicrous 
results. The vehicle of Respondent was one-quarter mile away 
from the roadblock when it turned around. The lights emanating 
from the roadblock were consistent with some traffic accidents. 
There is nothing to indicate that the occupants of Respondents 
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vehicle even knew that a roadblock existed. Assuming arguendo 
that the driver of Respondent's vehicle recognized the lights 
as being those of a roadblock, there is nothing to compel a 
continuation of the journey to that location. Otherwise, any 
motorist, at any location, when seeing the lights of a 
roadblock, however distant, would be required to travel to the 
location of the roadblock and submit to the seizure and 
interrogation which would follow. Would a rancher, seeing a 
roadblock some miles distant, be required to proceed to that 
location, and interrupt his intended journey along a side road 
to his ranch. Would a motorist, driving for pleasure, upon 
seeing a roadblock some miles ahead, be required to proceed to 
that location when his or her intended journey had its 
destination elsewhere. The trial court answered these 
questions by correctly finding that Mthere is no State statute 
requiring motorists, upon observing a roadblock, to continue 
thereto and stop." (Finding 15, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law -- see Addendum) 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Reasonable suspicion to stop Respondent did not exist. 
The stop was impermissible under UCA §77-7-15, and invaded the 
rights of Respondent which are afforded to him by Article I, 
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Section 14, Constitution of Utah, and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, All evidence learned or seized 
by law enforcement officers as a result of the stop is fffruit 
of the poisonous tree" and was properly suppressed. The ruling 
of the trial Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 1989. 
LABRUM, TAYLOR § BLACKWELL 
MARCUS TAYLOR j \ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herewith and hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were placed in the United States 
mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully 
prepaid, this 30th day of January, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney 
P.O. Box 388 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
MARCUS TAYLOR/ 1 
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4. On June 19, 1987 at about 10:00 P.M. a road block 
was established by the Garfield County Sheriff on U. S. Highway 89 
at Milepost 130, a location about three miles south and east of 
Panguitch, Utah. 
5. The road block was comprised of five people and four 
vehicles. The five people were the Sheriff, a Deputy and three 
members of the Sheriff's Posse. All were in uniform and carrying 
flashlights. The four vehicles were two police vehicles and two 
private vehicles. Each vehicle was equipped with standard, four-way 
emergency flashers, which were in operation. Each vehicle displayed 
a law enforcement symbol on the doors. Each police vehicle was 
equipped with a red spotlight mounted on the driver's door post 
which was illuminated and flashing. 
6. The police vehicles were parked on the asphalt 
portion of the highway but outside the traffic lanes so as to face 
oncoming traffic. The private vehicles were parked on the shoulder 
of the highway. 
7. There were no flares, warning signs, nor any traffic 
control devices used. 
8. All traffic was stopped at the road block where the 
officers checked for drivers licenses, vehicle registration and any 
safety equipment violations. 
STATE VS. TALBOT 
CASE 87-CR-196 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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STATE VS. TALBOT 
CASE 87-CR-196 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PAGE -4-
(a) 41-6-26 since, by its own terms, it applies to 
traffic signals or signs which were not used in this 
case; 
(b) Section 41-6-13, since Defendant never reached 
the road block. 
(c) Section 41-6-13.5, since there is no evidence 
that any signal was directed toward this Defendant from 
the road block. 
15. There is no state statute requiring 
motorists, upon observing a road block, to continue thereto 
and stop. 
The foregoing Findings of Fact are sufficient to 
to support the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The road block was proper since it was 
planned in advance and since every car was stopped. 
2. The evidence seized from Defendant must be 
suppressed. It was seized in violation of (a) Article I, 
Section 14, Utah Constsitution, (b) U. S. Constitution, 
Amendments 4 and 14, and (c) Section 77-7-15 U.C.A. 
Dated this ^LX- day of ntftt- , 19_22_-
Davi^L. Mower, Circuit Judge 
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